Abstract: Single-company event studies are commonly employed in applied practice, such as in analyzing m arket efficiency, reliance, and damages in securities litigation. However, the presence of significant company-specific events among the observations used to estimate the market model results in significantly biased, overstated standard errors (a well-known omitted variables problem) and less reliable coefficient estimates in such studies. This is a frequently over-looked or neglected issue that renders the statistical inferences in single-company event studies employing using more traditional event study techniques biased and often unreliable. This paper demonstrates through simulation and actual examples that, even allowing for errors in implementation, intervention analysis (identifying and controlling for all identified company-specific events) substantially improves the reliability of the coefficient estimates and reduces the biases (resulting in substantially more correct statistical inferences) in single-company event study analyses.
Summary
This paper provides an empirical comparison between two alternative and generally accepted event study methodologies, comparing the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) method 1 (CAR Method) to the comprehensive intervention method 2 (Intervention Method) in order to test in single-company event studies the relative importance of and information gain (gain in precision of the estimates and power of the statistical tests) from controlling for extraneous company-specific events. Single-company event studies are frequently used in applied analyses and litigation to determine issues of materiality and damages. 3 However, a number of misconceptions regarding the reliability of the CAR and (incomplete) event parameter methods 4 (Limited Intervention Method) for estimating market models in event study analyses are commonly observed. This paper presents examples that disprove a number of those misconceptions and demonstrates that the Intervention method is substantially superior in practice to the CAR Method in terms of reducing or eliminating the known biases in the estimates and substantial biases in the statistical inferences in single-company event study analyses.
In large, multi-company event studies, many of the statistical issues in modeling security price movements discussed in the time-series literature (such as the effects of skewness and kurtosis in the residuals; model misspecification; structural changes in the model over time; 5 and conditional heteroskedasticity 6 ) are typically not addressed because the large sample of events of interest across multiple companies tends to reduce the average rate of error, the magnitude of known biases, and the standard error of the mean estimates such that the additional gain in precision associated with controlling for extraneous company-specific events is assumed to be relatively small. 7 Additionally, comprehensive This methodology was first popularized for use generally in time-series analyses in Box and Tiao (1975) , and partially implemented and discussed in the context of event studies in Larcker et al. (1980) ; Karafiath, (1988) ; and Malatesta (1986) . An equivalent methodology (OLS -All News Omitted Model and All-News Conditioned Model) was discussed and tested in Thompson, Olsen & Dietrich (1988) , and the concept of controlling for extraneous events was considered and tested by Thompson (1988) . See, also, Marais and Schipper (2005) for other references and a general discussion of methods. 3 See, for example, Tabak and Dunbar (2001) . See, also, Marais and Schipper (2005) . 4 See, for example, Karafiath, (1988) and Malatesta (1986) wherein they control for only the events of interest and not all company-specific events or significant company-specific events. . 5 For example, Burnett et al. (1996) found violations of stationarity in the market model parameters in 71% of the 150 firms studied over a 14-month period from December 1985 to January 1987 with 43% of the firms exhibiting more than one shift.
techniques for identifying and controlling for interventions (company-specific news events likely to affect security price returns or trading volume) are typically not feasible in large, multiple-company event studies. 8 The large number of companies considered and sample size results in adequate power in these multi-company event studies. 9 Thus, the importance of controlling for company-specific news events has often been neglected in the academic event study literature, 10 and this neglect has resulted in major misconceptions in applied event study analyses involving single companies, such as often are produced in the context of securities litigation.
In single-company event studies, given the focus of the analyses on specific events of interest in applied work, the statistical issues identified in the academic time-series and event study literature (that are often discounted or ignored in the multiple-company event studies) are magnified in importance. For this reason, the traditional CAR Method lacks power in testing for the statistical significance for events of interest in single-company event studies and is biased against finding statistical significance in such single-company studies. 11 Thus, methods that might be acceptable in an academic, multiple-company event study are often no longer sufficiently reliable to be acceptable in a single-company event study for applied purposes. 12 A fundamental assumption underlying the estimation of event studies is that the sample observations in the estimation window used to estimate the market model in the event study analysis are free from any material company-specific events. 13 In most instances, a this is generally not a problem for event studies since the test statistics converge to their asymptotic distributions rather quickly" (p. 177). 8 Aktas et al. (2007) states, "A natural solution seems to be to choose, on a case-by-case basis, an estimation window free of such contaminating events. This solution is, however, unreasonable for large-sample analyses. When compiling data for several hundred (or several thousand) observations (e.g. in the field of merger and acquisitions)…using such a "brute force" approach quickly becomes intractable" p. 130. 9 See, for example, Gilson and Black (1975) , p. 202. 10 For example, a recent review paper by Kothari and Warner (2007) does not even discuss singlecompany event studies or the issue of extraneous company-specific events contaminating the estimation of the market model and substantially biasing the statistical inferences toward failing to find statistical significance. Similarly, the subject of single-company event studies is not discussed in Campbell et al. (1997) and the issue of extraneous company-specific events (or outliers) biasing the estimates and biasing the statistical inferences is barely mentioned in the text and not specifically addressed in the context of comprehensive intervention analysis, presumably because the authors believe this issue to be "small" and to have minimal effect as the sample size increases across multiple companies (pp. 163 and 177). 11 See, for example, Gilson and Black (1975) , p. 202. 12 See, for example, Jackson, Kline and Skinner (2006), pp. 259-262. 13 See, for example, Saidane and Lavergne (2008) , p. 23 (The estimation window, also called pre-event period, is a time span before the event period. During this period, the considered market is supposed to be in a normal situation, which means that no events have occurred.") and 26 ("Estimation period identification: Standard approach supposes that no events affect the market during the estimation period. Therefore, the determination of the starting point, or the endpoint of estimation period, must be carefully chosen so that the estimation period will not contaminate any potential effects owing to any event. This hypothesis is so strong and rarely possible, since defining a normal situation of the market is a difficult task. Moreover, the pre-event window is most often defined as a sufficiently long period preceding the event (between 250 and 300 days in case of daily data). Aktas et al. (2003) showed that substantial portion of the variance in security returns and non-normality of the market model residuals can be explained by known companyspecific events. 14 When company-specific events explain a substantial portion of the variance in the security returns considered in estimating the market model, then the failure to control for (or attempt to control for) such events results in severely biased statistical inferences in favor of failing to find statistical significance (failing to reject the null hypothesis of no eve nt or no material event). 15 This result is not surprising and has been generally known in the statistics literature, particularly in the context of intervention analysis, for a long time despite often being ignored in the event study literature. 16 In order to illustrate this issue and the magnitude of the loss of precision in the estimates and biases in the statistical inferences, this paper tests alternative event study methods through Monte Carlo simulation based on simulated series of company-specific events and security returns with characteristics consistent with real-world observations. The conclusions from the analyses in this paper are fairly obvious from a statistical standpoint this approach may generate a significant risk of bias for the analysis of specific kinds of corporate events."); Jackson, Kline and Skinner (2006) 14 See, for example, Thompson, Olsen and Dietrich (1987) (studied the incidence and effects of earnings announcements, dividend announcements, accounting/corporate events, capital/ownership changes, asset changes, management-related events, labor-related events, forecasts or analysis, product-related events, financial distress, income tax-related events and certain other events across 2,358 firms in 1983); Thompson, Olsen and Dietrich (1988) (extended work in the prior paper to demonstrate the effect of controlling for news events on standard errors in market model estimation); Ryan and Taffler (2004) (finding that substantial portions of both daily stock price returns and daily increases in trading volume for equity securities studies on the London Stock Exchange are explained by company-specific events) and Nimalendran (1994) , pp. 451-454, 461, 468-469. A recent working paper (not to be quoted) following the work in Roll (1988) reportedly found that a substantial number of trade days (an average of 35 news-events per firm-year, or greater than once every eight trade days, across thousands of firms and years from 1995-2004) were contaminated by eight types of identified company-specific news (analyst reports, conference calls, dividend disclosures, earnings announcements, insider activity, merger or acquisition activity, management forecasts, and secondary equity offerings) in a news search. As shown in Table 4 , consistent with Roll (1988) , the adjusted-R-squared of the simple market models in this paper were improved only modestly but significantly from approximately 30% to 37% on average by estimating the market model over the non-event days, rather than all trade days. More importantly, however, the mean absolute values of the market model abnormal returns residuals were significantly reduced by excluding event days from the simple market model regression. As Table 4 demonstrates, adjusted R-squared of the market model on all event days can be increased from an average of approximately 30% with a refined market and industry index to consistently over 50% and often over 70% by controlling for company-specific news events and the standard errors of the market model regressions can be reduced substantially (by between 10% to over 50%) on the non-event days as compared with all trade days by controlling for identified company-specific events through company-specific searches. This improvement in the adjusted R-squared and standard errors occurred despite the fact that some remaining outliers associated with company-specific events were further identified in retrospective analyses of the results. and consistent with the insights of Box and Tiao (1975) . When the returns of a security are significantly explained by company-specific news events, as opposed to market and industry forces and normal "trading" noise, then the failure to control for companyspecific news events results, on average, in a slight bias and greater rate of error in the estimation of the market model and event effects of interest and a substantial overstatement of the standard error associated with the effects of the events of interest in a single-company event study. On the other hand, identifying in advance (a priori) and controlling for all known and identified "potentially" material company-specific events almost entirely or entirely eliminates the bias in the market model and event effect estimates, substantially reduces the rate of error in estimating the market model, reduces the rate of error in estimating the event effects of interest, and more correctly estimates the standard errors relative to the "true" underlying model. Furthermore, even with significant implementation errors (the failure to identify and control for all potentially material company-specific events or the identification and placement of some material company-specific events on the wrong dates), the Intervention Method results in less biased statistical inferences and substantially lower rates of error whe n estimating the market model and event effects.
Problems with the CAR Method
The CAR Method is based on the assumption that a "clean" estimation period can be identified (generally a period of time before the events of interest and outside the period contaminated by the information of interest) in order to estimate a market model for the returns from a security as a function of a market or industry index. 17 This market model is then used to estimate the predicted move ment in the security price and compare the difference between the actua l observed returns generated by holding the security with the predicted returns over the days of interest. The standard error of the market model regression is then used, as adjusted, to estimate the statistical significance of each event of interest.
The "null" hypothesis in an event study analysis is typically the assumption that an event or a set events of interest either had no effect on the security returns (two-tailed test) or had no effect in a predetermined direction (one-tailed test). In order to test this hypothesis, the CAR Method requires, in theory, that the "clean" period be a period representative of the period of interest such that: (i) the volatility (standard error) of the security returns (after controlling for market and industry indices) in the "clean" period is reflective of the volatility (standard error) on non-event days during the period of interest; and (ii) the relationship between the security returns of the company (or companies) of interest and the market or industry indices in the "clean" period is the same or relatively similar to the relationship between the security returns of the company and the market or industry indices in the period of interest. 18 Additionally, the significance tests in the CAR Method assume that security returns are normally distributed and relatively free of outliers (especially outliers related to extraneous company-specific events).
However, these assumptions regarding the "cle an" period used to estimate the market model using the CAR Method are rarely true in a single-company event study. 20 Often significant changes in the security occur over time that render the market relationships in the supposedly "clean" period significant ly different from the period of interest and, thus, bias the market model estimates and the estimated standard errors. Additionally, company-specific news events are relatively frequent and, thus, can "contaminate" and "bias" the market model estimates 21 and substantially contaminate and bias the estimated standard errors, resulting in some bias in the estimates of the abnormal returns and a substantial understatement of the statistical significance of the events of interest. 22 Security returns are rarely normally distributed and tend to exhibit a substantially larger number of extreme abnormal returns, most associated with company-specific news events, than assumed in the statistical tests based on the CAR Method estimates. 23 Given that the return distribution and characteristic assumptions underlying the CAR Method are of questionable validity, it is, therefore, not surprising that application of the CAR Method in single-company event study analyses typically results in significant biases in estimating the residual standard error and often lacks precision in estimating market model coefficients, event effects, and standard errors of the coefficients. Thus, the CAR Method typically generates incorrect statistical inferences in applied single-company event study analyses biased toward failing to find statistical significance. A large, crosssectional, multiple-company event study analysis will tend to reduce the estimation biases and reduce the aggregate standard errors used for deriving the statistical inferences by averaging the results across a large sample of different events and securities, expanding the sample of companies and events considered in order to reduce the biases and reduce the errors in average estimates. 24 But expanding the sample size is no t possible or typically results in no gain in precision in single-company event studies when only one or a few specific events of interest can be analyzed. Thompson, Olsen and Dietrich (1998) , "This increase in power appears to be due primarily to the inclusion of a broad set of firm-specific news events…in the model specification" [pp. 466-468]); and Higgins (1998), "These variance increases can cause problems when using the traditional one sample t-statistic to test for abnormal returns. One sample t-statistic will reject the null hypothesis of no abnormal returns too often when there are variance increases around an event."). See, also, Jackson, Kline and Skinner (2006), pp. 259-262. 23 See, for example, Ryan and Taffler (2004) (finding that substantial portions of both daily stock price returns and daily increases in trading volume for equity securities studies on the London Stock Exchange are explained by company-specific events); Nimalendran (1994) 24 See, for example, Thompson (1988) and Campbell et al. (1997) , pp. 163 and 177.
Initial Simulation of the Assumed Data-Generating Process for Security Returns with Pre -Determined Events
In order to demonstrate some of these issues of concern with respect to the application of the CAR Method in applied single-company event study analyses, I initially created ten simulated deterministic time-series of interventions for a single-security over a period of 500 days and compared it with results obtained using the traditional CAR Method with the Intervention Method. Returns were modeled based on a log-normal diffusion process with occasional "jumps" associated with pre-determined company-specific events. Each simulated event series had four company-specific events of interest: two "inflationary events," each with a 2.0% (natural log) effect, on days 251 and 313; and two "corrective" events with (natural log) effects of -3.0% and -1.0%, respectively, on days 490 and 491. Consistent with Tsay (2002), I assumed that company-specific events occurred periodically consistent with a Poisson distribution with a mean of 0.20 events per day if no event occurred on the preceding observation day. In order to reflect event clustering, I also assumed that the mean of the Poisson process increased on the day following a day with events. 25 In order to allow for a modest number of extreme events and a modest (but typically statistically insignificant) amount of "apparent" drift associated with companyspecific news events, I assumed that each individual event effect was based on a tdistribution with three degrees of freedom with a 50% chance of the event being negative and 50% chance of the event being positive. The Poisson distribution allowed for multiple events on a single day, with the effect of each event separately estimated. These assumptions produced material company-specific events on between one in every four and one in every five trade days in each simulated time-series, approximately consistent with my findings in a number of single-company event studies performed on major U.S. corporations. 26 Also consistent with my experience, the t-distribution assumption means that approximately one-third to one-half of the company-specific events exceed two times the standard error of the daily trading noise (assumed standard error of 0.6% in lognormal terms ) and between one-tenth and one-third of the company-specific events exceed three times the standard error of the assumed daily trading noise. After simulation, significant company-specific news events occur red approximately twice a month and extreme events (defined by three times the standard error of the trading noise) occurred on average once a month. The company-specific events represent the frequently observed daily "jumps" in a "jump-diffusion" process for modeling daily security returns. 27 
25
The exact formula was 0.2^(1/(1+number of events on the prior day)). 26 See Table 4 for actual examples of analyses performed in the past few years. See, also, for example, Roll (1988) , p. 558. While Roll relied only on Dow Jones news and Wall Street Journal databases to identify news for 96 large public companies, a broader search using Factiva (the current version of Dow Jones News Retrieval service), Lexis-Nexis, First Call, Investext, and Bloomberg, LP news and analyst report databases combined with the increase in the amount of financial press and the increase in the efficiency of the market (including reduced implicit bid-ask spreads) has resulted in greater frequency of company-specific news and a substantial improvement in the "goodness-of-fit" in the market model regressions relative to the results in Roll's study (where he noted that many outliers were apparently missed in his news search). 27 Nimalendran (1994), pp. 451-454.
After creating ten series of simulated deterministic events, I performed 5,000 Monte Carlo simulations on each individual event series and used both the CAR Method and the Intervention Method to estimate the market model parameters, event effects, and standard errors of the estimates after each simulation in order to determine the approximate "true" standard errors for the estimated event effects for the four events of interest and for the relationship between the security returns and index returns. Because each of the ten simulated event series produced a slightly skewed distribution of returns with substantial kurtosis, the simulations provide a reference for determining the nature of the rate of error and biases in estimating the coefficients and in the statistical inferences associated with both the CAR Method and the Intervention Method.
In order to simplify the Monte Carlo analysis (while remaining consistent with a stylized real-world example of a relatively stable equity security associated with a large and welldiversified public company) I assumed that the relationship of the security returns with returns from a combined market and industry index was one-to-one (in other words, an index Beta, or Beta, of 1.00) with the index having zero trend and the underlying standard error of the index being 0.6% (in log-normal terms). I also assumed trading noise had a zero mean and a log-normal daily standard error of 0.6%. The CAR Method estimated the market model over an assumed "clean" period was based on the first 250 observations (approximately one-year of trading in the real world) on each simulated return series and then used to estimate the effects of the four events of interest and their statistical significance. The Intervention Method considered the security returns over all 500 simulated trade days in each simulated return-series to estimate the market model after explicitly controlling (with intervention or dummy variables) for all known and identified material company-specific events ( presumably selected a priori), regardless of their actual effect or statistical significance. 28 (Table 1 ) Table 1 provides a comparison of the mean estimates resulting from both methods over each of the ten series of simulated events simulated 5,000 times. In each case, even with 28 This is also an important but often neglected control. The inclusion of intervention variables for all material (or "potentially material") events, regardless of their actual effects, will correctly estimate the standard errors. On the other hand, if one only controlled for those events that proved to have "significant" effects, the degrees of freedom used to estimate the standard errors would be overstated and one risks modestly understating the "true" standard errors of the estimates. This is a form of "cherry-picking," or "data-mining," that (while having little or no effect on the actual market model parameters and estimates of the event effects) slightly biases the standard errors and, therefore, the statistical inferences associated with the event effects of interest. As demonstrated in Table 2 , discussed later in this paper, the effects and concerns of including "too many" immaterial or erroneous interventions and the loss of degrees of freedom resulting from including "too many" events will have no measureable effects on the estimates of the parameters of the market model and event effects on average but will cause the standard errors of the estimates to be slightly overstated relative to the "true" standard errors. Thus, in terms of bias and consistency, it is better to be over-inclusive, rather than under-inclusive, when identifying material company-specific events a priori given the relatively slight loss in efficiency that results relative to the substantial portion gain in reliability and reduction in bias in the statistical inferences. For a general discussion of this issue see Intriligator (1978) , pp. 188-189, and Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1991), pp. 162-166. minimally skewed abnormal returns, the presence of pre-determined extraneous events causes the CAR Method estimates of the market model parameters (true constant trend of zero and Beta of 1.00) to be slightly biased, while the estimates of the constant using the comprehensive intervention method are unbiased and the bias in estimating Beta is reduced. By failing to control for known company-specific events, the CAR Method suggests a small, but economically meaningful, drift term (non-zero trend or constant term in the estimated market model) exists on average in most of the deterministic eventseries even though drift (non-zero trend or constant term) does not actually exist in the true underlying process. The error in the constant term represents a standard error on an annualized basis of 11.55% across the sample, which is a substantial bias on an annualized basis, even though it is not statistically significant in the individual CAR Method market model regression based on a single simulated return series. By comparison, the bias in the constant term estimated using the Intervention Method is insignificant and converges to zero as the number of simulations is increased. Furthermore, the standard errors for the constant term and Beta estimates are substantially reduced by the Intervention Method as compared with the CAR Method, reflecting the greater precision in estimation.
Comparison of the Initial CAR and Intervention Method Conclusions
The bias in the estimated constant term in the CAR Method causes the estimated event effects for each of the four events of interest to be modestly biased using the CAR Method, unless a correction is made by assuming a zero constant term. More importantly, however, the t -statistics for each of the four events of interest are substantially understated by approximately 40% using the CAR Method relative to the true t-statistics determined by Monte Carlo simulation. 29 The presence of significant company-specific events causes both the regression standard error and the standard errors for the events of interest to be substantially overstated in the CAR Method compared to the true standard errors. This is a classical omitted variables problem. By contrast, the Intervention Method correctly estimates the true standard errors and t-statistics for each of the events of interest.
The increase in the rate of error and potential bias in estimating the correct constant and Beta coefficients in the market model translates into increased potential for biases and increased rates of error in estimating the effects of each of the events of interest in the CAR Method. The average absolute bias across the ten series in estimating the effects of events one through four in the CAR Method is small but sufficient to be avoided when feasible. One method of partially correcting for this bias is simply to ignore the constant term and assume that it is actually zero when calculating the abnormal returns associated with each of the four events of interest. While ignoring (or setting equal to zero) the constant term solves most of the bias in estimating the event effects, it does not address the substantially greater rate of error in estimating the Beta (relationship between the market index and the security returns) in the CAR Method, nor does it correctly estimate the standard errors for the event effect estimates. The increase in the information content of market model in the Intervention Method regression can be observed in the improvement in the average adjusted R -squared reported from the Intervention Method regressions relative to the CAR Method regressions in Table 1 . As shown in Table 4 , for a large, diversified equity security, the CAR Method market model will typically result in an adjusted R-squared of between 10% and 50%, depending on the frequency and effects of company-specific events on security returns relative to: (i) the effects of market and industry news events on the security returns ; (ii) the amount of uncertainty and heterogeneity associated with the investor valuation of the subject security (which increases the unexplained portion of the daily return variance); 30 (iii) implied trading costs (including the average bid-ask spread) for the subject security (which tends to increase the unexplained portion of the daily return variance); and (iv) the quality of the indices in capturing the effects of market and industry news events on the subject security in the analyses. As shown in Table 4 , once company-specific news events are considered, in practice, the adjusted R-squared will typically increase substantially (to between 50% and 95% for equity securities issued by diversified, large capitalization companies). This is reflected in Table 1 by the increase in the adjusted R-squared in the market model from an average of 26% using the CAR Method to an average of 65% using the Intervention Method. Additionally, controlling for known company-specific news events substantially reduced the estimated standard error of the market model regression residuals in Table 4 (by an average of 30% for the 36 primary common stock regressions).
In applied analyses, such as in single-company event studies performed in securities litigation, the improvements in Table 4 in the "goodness-of-fit" and standard errors associated with the Intervention Method led to substantial differences in the statistical inferences and ultimate conclusions. To the extent an analyst uses the CAR Method to estimate the market model and event effects or only controls for the events of interest in the Limited I ntervention Method and fails to control for many known, significant extraneous events, Table 1 demonstrates that the result is to substantially understate the statistical significance of the events of interest, including more often failing to find statistical significance when statistical significance should exist. 31 In the examples presented, the CAR Method will consistently fail to find statistical significance in a onetail test at the 5% level for event four, while the correct test will on average find statistical significance in a one-tailed test for event four. The CAR Method will fail to find statistical significance at the 5% level in a two-tailed test fo r both events one and two almost half of the time, even though a correctly specified test of each of the two events should produce an average p-value of approximately 0.1% in a two-tailed test given the actual standard errors determined by Monte Carlo simulation. A researcher employing a conservative two-tailed test and requiring a p -value of 5% or less for statistical significance would, thus, mistakenly conclude that events one and two are both not statistically significant almost half of the time when, in fact, a correctly specified test 30 See Hanson and Sargent (2008) for a n interesting treatise on the theoretical effects of investor uncertainty as to the true underlying model and heterogeneity of investor beliefs on asset pricing and apparent anomalies (such as the "equity risk premium puzzle") when assumed asset pricing mo dels are tested against real-world return data. 31 See, for example, Nimalendran (1994) , pp. 451-454, 461, and 468-469; and Higgins (1998).
should find statistical significance for those two events almost always. Thus, in such circumstances where extraneous events are an important part of the return g enerating process (as in almost all instances involving common equity securities); the CAR Method generates an unacceptable bias and rate of error in the statistical inferences involving events of interest. Additionally, this discussion illustrates why the failure to find statistical significance should not be mistakenly used to claim that no effect occurred or that an event was "immaterial." 32 
Simulation of Random Extraneous Events and Skewness
In order to further extend Monte Carlo simulation results and test additional issues, I generated a series of Monte Carlo simulations involving six events with pre-determined dates and effects and 94 randomly simulated extraneous events (random dates and random effects, although a slight overlap occasionally resulted in the loss of one or fewer events in a limited percentage of the overall simulations). Given the randomly simulated and deterministic event and market model assumptions, Table 2 The basic return generating model is as follows: log-normal common stock return on day x = 0.0% + 1.00 times log-normal market index return on day x + log-normal effect of event(s) on day x + e. In order to reflect the trading noise associated with common equity securities, the market index is assumed to have zero drift and a daily volatility of 1.8%, instead of the 0.6% assumed in Table 1 , in log-normal terms. This translates into an annualized volatility of approximately 28% for the market index. Similarly, I assume that trading noise (e) component has a mean of zero and an independent log-normal standard error of 2.0%.
The natural log event effects of interest on days 251, 313, 490 and 491 are set at +4.0%, +4.0%, -6.0% and -3.0%, respectively, in order to ensure that (in the true model) they are jointly significant (at the 5% level in a two-tailed test), that the company-specific events were individually statistically significant at the 5% level (two-tailed test) on days 251, 313, and 490, and "statistically meaningful" at the 10%-significance level (one-tailed test) on day 491. Additionally, joint tests of the significance of days 251 and 313 together should find statistical significance at the 5% level (two-tailed test) most of the time and should find statistical significance at the 5% level (two-tailed test) almost always for a joint test of days 490 and 491 together.
Two additional pre-determined events on days 60 and 130 with negative (log-normal) effects of -30.0% and -10.0% were added to simulate the skewness (and kurtosis) commonly observed in actual return data. Each of the remaining 94 deterministic 32 This is a common mistake made by experts, particularly experts that tend to work for defendants in securities lit igation. An example of such conceptual error can be found in Tabak and Dunbar (2001). extraneous company-specific events were simulated to occur randomly over time (over the 500 observation days, excluding days with known events) with the natural log effect of each individual event simulated with a t -distribution with two degrees of freedom (instead of three degrees of freedom in the prior simulations) times 2.0% and with an even probability of each event effect being positive or negative. Table 2 provides the results of a baseline CAR analysis with no contaminating events estimated over 400 observation days for comparison with the CAR Method, a Limited Intervention Method that only controls for the four events of interest, and the Perfect Intervention Method. The presence of contaminating events i n the estimation window causes the adjusted R-squared for the market model in the CAR Method (20.80%) to be substantially understated relative to the true adjusted R -squared on non-event days (44.68%).
True Baseline Model Compared with CAR and Perfect Implementation of Intervention Analysis
The existence of skewness in the estimation window causes the estimated constant term in the CAR Method to be significantly biased (-0.16%) and the constant term in the Limited Intervention Method to be biased (-0.08%) compared to the true constant term (0.00%) and constant term estimated by the Perfect Intervention Method. The existence of uncontrolled extraneous events in the estimation windows for the CAR and Limited Intervention Methods also leads to a substantial loss of precision in the estimation of the constant term. This can be seen in the elevated standard errors for constant term of 0.257% for the CAR Method and 0.175% for the Limited Intervention Method as compared with the standard error of 0.100% in both the True Model and the Perfect Intervention Analysis.
The skewness introduced does not significantly bias the estimation of the market index Beta in either the CAR Method or the Limited Intervention Method, but the existence of uncontrolled extraneous events in the estimation window causes the standard errors for the market index Beta estimates to be substantially greater, at 15.8% in the CAR Method and 10.2% in the Limited Intervention Method compared to the True Model and the Perfect Intervention Method standard errors of 5.5%. This again illustrates the increased power and precision associated with controlling for extraneous company-specific events.
By including events with known effects skewed in one direction in the estimation period (the "clean" period in the CAR Method), the constant term in the market model is biased in the CAR and Limited Intervention Methods, resulting in a biased estimation of the event effects of interest unless one adjusts the market model to assume a zero constant term. This bias is small, but economically meaningful on an annualized basis, when the introduced company-specific events result in extremely statistically significant abnormal returns skewed in a single direction. 33 Additionally, the introduction of the additional 33 In practice, I often find that the constant term is sufficiently different from zero in the CAR Method market model to imply economically meaningful "drift" in security returns. This estimated drift is typically substantially reduced, but not entirely eliminated, after an applied comprehensive extreme events and failure to control for extraneous events further biases upward the estimated standard errors in the CAR and Limited Intervention Methods and, thus, increases the rate of error in estimating the market model coefficients and reduces the estimated statistical significance of the events of interest relative to their "true" significance. In Table 2 , the t -statistics for each of the four events of interest are understated by more than 40% using the CAR Method of calculating t-statistics relative to the actual t -statistics determined by the Monte Carlo simulation using the CAR Method. Similarly, the t-statistics for each of the four events of interest are understated by more than 38% using the Limited Intervention Method relative to the actual t-statistics determined by the Monte Carlo simulation using the CAR Method. By contrast, both the True Model and the Perfect Intervention Method yield almost identical t -statistic estimates for each of the four events of interest, produc ing no meaningful bias in estimating the correct t-statistics given the specified method.
The averages from the simulation results summarized in Table 2 illustrate the problems with incomplete event analyses that fail to control for known company-specific events. The event effect estimates are biased slightly (not statistically significant in individual market model regressions, but a statistically significant bias is found across a large number of simulations) using the CAR Method and Incomplete Intervention Method. Both methods fail to find statistical significance consistently on average for each of the four events of interest at the 5% level in a two-tailed test and for three of the four events of interest at the 5% level in a one-tailed test. Note that by including a larger sample of observation dates and controlling for the events of interest, the skewness in the extraneous event effects is reduced and the bias the event effect estimates is, correspondingly, reduced. Additionally, the t-statistics for each of the four events of interest are increased modestly as a result of the Limited Intervention Method as compared with the CAR Method. Thus, the event parameter method (Incomplete Intervention Method) still represents an improvement over the CAR Method when the underlying market model is stationary throughout the period studied when a larger number of observations has the potential to reduce the skewness in the abnormal returns and increases the degrees of freedom fo r estimating the market model. Table 2 is the primary assumed "corrective" event in the context of securities litigation. If a researcher were to insist on finding statistical significance at the 5% level in a two-tailed test, then the researcher would be led to mistakenly fail to find statistical significance most of the time for this event using the CAR Method. This failure to find statistical significance would then lead some researchers to mistakenly conclude that the corrective information was not "material" and led to "no damages," or led to no reliably measureable damages, even though the event effect was -6.0%, which is often considered more than sufficient to be material in practice. 34 While the biased CAR Method estimate of the effect of event three of -5.83% (bias of 0.17% on average) is reasonably reliable in practice, the estimate of the standard error of the estimate and the tstatistic for event three in the CAR Method are substantially and unacceptably biased for intervention analysis, suggesting that a small portion of the extremely significant company-specific events were not identified in the a priori event search. use in applied analyses. The true absolute t-statistic for event three is 3.00 for the CAR Method (which is well beyond the significance level required to reject the null hypothesis that event three did not cause a decline in the price of the security), but the CAR Method incorrectly produces an estimated absolute t-statistic for event three of only 1.67, 42% lower than the correct, unbiased t-statistic.
Event three in
The combined effects of events three and four are -9.0% in natural log terms. The joint test of significance for these two events (which is the correct hypothesis test) results in a joint t-statistic of -3.19 (-9.0% combined effect in natural log terms divided by the joint standard error of 2.82%). Thus, even though event four is not quite statistically significant at the 5% level in a one-tailed test, given that is it determined to be a "corrective" event on a priori grounds, it should be included in the analysis because it further increases the confidence and precision of the estimated effect of the corrective news over the combined two days. 35 Excluding event four from the analysis would downward bias the overall effect of the corrective news disseminated over the two days, 490 and 491. By contrast, the estimated joint t-statistic for events three and four from the CAR Method on average was only 1.74 in Table 2 , which would be significant at the 5% level in only a one-tailed test but not in a two-tailed test. Thus, a researcher applying a strict requirement of statistical significance for consideration of events in an applied analysis would again, using the CAR Method, exclude at least event four from the analysis by mistake and materially underestimate the total effect of the corrective information on the security returns over days 490 and 491 combined by more than 33%. In practice, a researcher applying the CAR Method without controlling for known extraneous company-specific events and insisting on a joint absolute t-statistic of 1.96, would mistakenly fail to find materiality and fail to reliably estimable damages in securities litigation, even though the investor experienced a known loss of -9.0% over two days as a result of the corrective information and the true significance level was less than 0.1% in a one-tailed test (given the null hypothesis of no negative effect) and 0.15% in a two-tailed test.
Similarly, the test of the statistical significance of events one and two combined produces a joint t-statistic of 2.83 (p-value of 0.5% in a two-tailed test), well beyond the threshold required for the inclusion of both events in the analysis under a standard hypothesis test. However, the CAR Method would suggest that the joint significance of these two events was only marginal on average with a joint t-statistic of 1.67 (p-value of 9.5% in a twotailed test). A researcher using the intervention method would conclude that events one and two were "highly" material ("inflationary" and statistically significant at better than the 1.0% significance level in the context of securities litigation). By contrast, a researcher setting a high threshold for statistical significance (two-tailed test or lower pvalue, or significance level, requirement) and using the CAR Method would mistakenly 35 The specific concept is explicitly stated in Kennedy (2003) , "It would be wiser to adopt a much smaller critical t value, say 1.0. For F-tests the p value is an easier guide; rather than a critical value of 0.05, a critical value of, say, 0.3 would be more suitable" (p. 409), and "Testing for exclusion of independent variables should adopt a low critical t value (1.0 or less, for example, rather than the traditional 2.0) to minimize the influence of type II errors (i.e., to avoid omitting a relevant variable)). In general, pretesting of any kind should be conducted using a significance level much higher (say, 25%) than the traditional 5%" (p. 413).
conclude that events one and two were both individually and collectively not statistically significant and, therefore, immaterial.
36 Thus, the CAR Method results in such a large loss in power and such a significant bias in the tests of statistical significance for the events of interest in Table 2 as to result more often than not in the wrong conclusions as to the statistical significance of each of the four events of interest.
The Effect of Implementation Errors in Intervention Analyses
In retrospective event studies, a perfectly implemented Intervention Method is not possible. Many company-specific news events are often not knowable, or able to be identified, in a retrospective analysis given the available news databases (such as are available from on Bloomberg, LP, Factiva, or Lexis-Nexis) or available analyst reports (such as found in Thomson Financial's First Call or Investext databases) and given budgetary and time considerations. As an alternative, identifying company-specific news events based on observed outliers (using iterative techniques) or "normalizing" the residuals to control for significant unidentified news events (after having already initially estimated the market model) are generally accepted alternatives to the Intervention Method to address known statistical issues in estimating market models and ha ve been widely discussed in the literature, 37 including in the context of event studies. 38 However, these iterative methods are highly assumptive, ex post methods for dealing with nonnormality and, thus, risk over-correcting for (data-mining or "cherry-picking") the extreme events while failing to similarly control for the less extreme material events (events that contain important news and induce trading volume increases but may result in mixed investor reactions or conflicting information such that a statistically significant daily security price return is not observed).
39 Thus, the "natural solution" of manually identifying and controlling for known events a priori based on some pre-determined criteria is preferable when feasible.
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In practice, the most obviously material events are identified and controlled for in the Intervention Method with a low rate of error. 41 As will be discussed later in this paper and demonstrated in Table 3 , manual application of the ex post event selection still represents such a substantial improvement over the CAR Method and incomplete intervention method, in terms of reducing biases and errors in both the estimates and the statistical inferences, that they should always be utilized instead of the CAR Method when the comprehensive intervention method is not feasible. However, the t-statistics of the events of interest will be slightly overstated in practice as a result of ex post event selection. See, also, Aktas et al. Ex post searches for news and information, including time-consuming searches through additional news and information sources, such as Internet bulletin board postings, to explain significant abnormal returns not already associated with identified events typically find very few errors when the searches performed a priori were extensive and double-checked. Most of the time, the rate of omission represents less than a few events over multiple years of observations and consistently less than 1% to 2% of the events identified a priori in practice, unless the security is associated with a company with limited analyst and news coverage. Even when double-checking a first pass search for company-(dup licative or immaterial) events or mistakes in placing company-specific events on the correct dates will occur. In practice, I have found that two different researchers reviewing the same sets of news or searching over the same databases will tend to agree between 95% and 99% of the time on the material events following pre-determined criteria and agree almost always on those events that actually led to statistically significant abnormal security price returns. Additionally, a post hoc examination of the trading volume data and abnormal returns will tend to find a relatively small number of additional events that were missed in the a priori event search either due to the absence of reported news in the databases searched or oversights by the researchers.
In order to understand the effects of implementation errors, I included in Table 2 simulations of the Imperfect Intervention Method wherein some proportion of the extraneous events are incorrectly identified on the wrong dates, excluded from the analysis, or a random number of alternative "non-event" dates are identified by mistake as being associated with material company-specific news (resulting in some loss of degrees of freedom). In the first set of Imperfect Intervention Method simulations, I assumed that incorrect non-event dates representing 10% of the "actual" companyspecific events were included in the analyses as event dates by mistake. In the second set of Imperfect Intervention Method simulations, I assumed that 2 0% of the "actual" company-specific events were omitted by mistake. Then in the third set of Imperfect Intervention Method simulations, both sets of assumptions regarding implementation errors were combined to simulate and determine the effects of missing 20% of the actual company-specific events and mistakenly identifying company-specific event dates on non-event dates equal to 10% of the actual events (alternatively, placing actual companyspecific events on the wrong dates in the intervention analyses). This simulation should provide an upper bound on the degree of error in estimating the market model parameters and event effects and the loss in precision and consequent increase in the estimated standard errors relative to the "true" standard errors that result from common implementation errors in real-world practice. specific events the number of additionally identified company-specific events is typically less than 5% to 10% of the events already selected on the first pass. Even lower rates of error are found for errors in the form of identifying events on the wrong dates (event timing errors) or mistakenly controlling for events that were immaterial and clearly should not have been selected given the protocol employed for identifying and selecting events (selection errors).
implementation of the Intervention Method, and result in a statistically significant improvement in the power of the statistical tests of statistical significance for the events of interest relative to the CAR and Limited Intervention Methods.
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While a variety of alternative assumptions regarding implementation errors may be considered, the basic conclusion remains valid that failing to control for known (potentially) material events is always inferior to the Intervention Method that controls for known events identified a priori, even when the errors and omissions in identifying material events equal or exceed 50% of the actual material company-specific events.
One conclusion from Table 2 is that the inclusion of extra "false" events in the Intervention Method equal to 10% of the actual company-specific events has an immaterial effect on the market model estimates and the event effect estimates and results in only slight increases the estimated standard errors of those estimates (primarily due to a loss of degrees of freedom). The "false" events could be actual company-specific events that are mistakenly identified twice (once on the correct date and again on the wrong date) or simply immaterial company-specific events that should not have been identified and controlled for in the analysis. Regardless of the reason for the "false" events, the conclusion is the same statistically that the inclusion of additional "false" events in the intervention method regression has only a minimal average effect of slightly increasing the standard errors of the estimates in the market model relative to the actual standard errors.
Whereas introducing extra "false" events has only a minimal effect on the reliability of the analyses, failing to identify and control for a significant percentage of "actual" events does result in a significant loss of precision in estimating the market model parameters (shown in the significantly greater standard errors) relative to the True Model and the Perfect Intervention Method. The estimates of the four events of interest are slightly less precise, but the estimated standard errors for those four events are significantly biased, causing materially understated t-statistics (approximately 10% lower than actual) for each of the four events of interest. However, this bias in estimating the t-statistics for the four events of interest is only approximately 25% of the degree of bias associated with the CAR and the Limited Intervention Methods. Despite the reduced t-statistics and increased standard errors estimated for the eve nts of interest when 20% of the extraneous events are missed, joint tests of the significance of events one and two as well as events three and four would recommend that all four events be included in the analysis at a significance level of 1.0%, even though the individual t-statistics for events one and two are reduced below the threshold for the 5% significance level in a two-tailed test. Given the simulations summarized in Table 2 , the understatement of the estimated t-statistics for the events of interest of approximately 10% is tolerable in most instances, as long as joint tests are still considered along with individual tests of statistical significance. Thus, one should always prefer the imperfect implementation of the Intervention Method to the CAR Method or to the Limited Intervention Method, whenever feasible. Given the extent of the loss in precision and known biases in the statistical inferences generated by 42 This result is not surprising and is generally guaranteed whenever the F-test for the extraneous events is statistically significant at the 5% level.
the CAR Method set forth in Tables 1 and 2 , simple CAR and Limited Intervention Methods should be avoided in favor of a more thorough Intervention Method whenever feasible in a single-company event study analysis.
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Selective Implementation of the Comprehensive Intervention Method (Table 3) It is often the case that researchers only control for the most obvious ly significant extraneous company-specific events in applied intervention analysis or remove from consideration all identified extraneous company-specific events that were found to be sufficiently insignificant after initial estimation to supposedly " justify" their removal from the regression analysis. These practices result from misconceptions that variables should only be statistically significant or, at least, "meaningful" in some statistical sense (increasing the "information" in t he regression) in order to remain in the regression analysis. 44 While the practice of excluding independent variables from the final regression when they fail to meet some minimum threshold for improving the "information" in the regression is generally valid for independent variables that vary in some manner across the entire set of observations or a substantial portion of the observations (especially when multicollinearity is significant), it is not a recommended practice when considering observation-specific intervention variables that are part of a series of intervention variables selected a priori. A set of selected intervention variables are more properly regarded as a single control, or dummy, variable set that is zero for observations with no identified interventions (uncontaminated observations) and one (or non-zero) on days with identified interventions (contaminated observations), but with the loss of degrees of freedom resulting from the inclusion of the control variable set in the regression analysis typically equal to the number of observations with non-zero control values. Given this, the proper statistical question is whether (based on an F-test or joint t -test) the set of intervention variables as a whole contributes to the information content of the regression. 45 Thus, when interventions are identified and selected a priori, individual interventions that have estimated absolute t-statistics below some threshold should either not be removed from the final regression or the degrees of freedom in the final regression should be corrected to reflect the prior existence, testing, and removal of interventions that had minimal or "insignificant" estimated effects. 46 In Table 3 of relative significance for each extraneous event. The basic return volatility and market model assumptions for the simulations in Table 3 are the same as employed in Table 1 . Instead of simulating 10 deterministic event series, I simulated 25 deterministic event series and then simulated the security returns 1,000 times for each deterministic event series and reported the market model regression and event effect estimates and test statistics from applying each method over the 25,000 total simulations. The number of extraneous events ranged from 97 to 150 across the 25 pre-determined (simulated) event series. The alternative methods considered were, in order, the CAR Method, the Limited Intervention Method (controlling only for the four events of interest), the Perfect Intervention Method, the Imperfect Intervention Method with only events with absolute tstatistics known to be in excess of 1.00 included in the regression on both a priori and ex post bases, and the Imperfect Intervention Method with only events with absolute tstatistics known to be in excess of 1.65 included in the regression on both a priori and ex post bases.
With respect to the comparisons of the CAR Method, the Limited Intervention Method and the Perfect Intervention Method, the results are consistent with the observed results in Table 1 and Table 2 . The slight skewness in the event effects simulated in the 25 event series results in a slight bias (not statistically significant in individual regressions but significantly different from zero across all simulations) in the constant terms and event effect estimates in the CAR and event parameter methods relative to the Perfect Intervention Method. The estimated t-statistics for the four events of interest are biased substantially downward, more than 40% on average, in the CAR and Limited Intervention Methods, while the Perfect Intervention Method generates approximately the correct t-statistics for the event effects of interest. None of this is surprising, but this finding, nevertheless, reinforces the fact that researchers and academics have major misconceptions regarding the relative reliability and appropriateness of the statistical inferences derived from the CAR Method and Limited Intervention Methods.
With Imperfect Intervention Methods excluding events a priori that were unlikely to cause meaningful or significant security price effects, I expected the effect of excluding the least significant events from the final intervention method analysis (without correcting the degrees of freedom to account for this removal of known interventions from the regressions) to result in no significant bias in the estimation of the market model and event effect coefficients but to potentially overstate to a slight degree the t-statistics of the events of interest. In fact, as shown in Table 3 , the absence of bias is not confirmed and the absolute t-statistics for the events of interest are reduced (not increased) relative to the actual t -statistics by the perfect a priori removal of the "insignificant" (but material) company-specific events. Failing to control a priori for the effects of the relatively "small" and "insignificant" company-specific events causes some small increase in the estimated standard error of the market model and error in estimating the market model and event effect coefficients relative to the Perfe ct Intervention Method. The more limited and selective the researcher is in choosing events a priori, the greater the loss in power and precision and, consequently, the greater the reduction in the estimated absolute t-statistics of the events of interest relative to the actual t-statistics for those events. While selectively controlling for known, material company-specific events reduces the estimation biases and improves the reliability of the estimates and statistical inferences relative to the CAR Method and Limited Intervention Method, there is some loss of "information, and resulting loss of precision and power in the estimates and statistical inferences when the researcher is more selective in choosing interventions a priori. Thus, "cherry-picking" the events with perfect foresight to include only the "statistically significant" or "statistically meaningful" events has only a slight effect on the statistical inferences in slightly reducing the absolute t-statistics for each of the four events of interest but, otherwise, yields approximately correct and reliable conclusions and is substantially superior to CAR and Limited Intervention Methods in terms of reducing the errors in estimation and yielding substantially more correct statistical inferences.
The last two columns in Table 3 simulate the results from selecting only those extraneous events that produced estimated absolute t -statistics greater than 1.00 and 1.65, respectively, in each initial market model regression simulated. As expected, eliminating the "insignificant" events from the market model regression after estimation (ex post) is a type of data-mining, 47 caus ing the degrees of freedom to be understated and the resulting standard errors to be understated relative to the true standard errors. This has the effect of modestly overstating the absolute t-statistics for all four of the events of interest by approximately 7.4% to 8.4% on average. Additionally, contrary to what might be expected, the actual rate of error in estimating the market model coefficients is not reduced by removing the "insignificant" extraneous company-specific events. This illustrates the point made earlier in this section that when intervention variables are selected a priori and on economic (or reasoned) bases, then it is generally better to leave them in the analysis than take them out of the analysis even if they have statistically insignificant estimated effects. There is no real efficiency gained from removing insignificant events from the market model regression and the removal of such events (without correcting the degrees of freedom in the regression to account for such deletion of variables) risks biasing upward the t-statistics of the events of interest. 48 Nevertheless, from a bias and efficiency perspective, it is still better to control for known extraneous events on an ex post basis (as long as the company-specific events meet some prespecified qualitative or economic criteria for being material or "potentially" material) than to do nothing. While selective identification of events ex post can bias upward the tstatistics, as demonstrated in Table 2 , errors in implementation tend to bias downward the t-statistics of the events of interest in practice such that the two sets of errors in implementation will tend to be offsetting and the gain in efficiency and improvement over the CAR Method, in terms of the power and reliability of the statistical inferences, justifies the additional effort of controlling for events associated with identified outliers and significant stock price movements. Thus, the simulation results summarized in Tables 2 and 3 in terms of increasing efficiency and reducing the potential biases in the estimates and tests of statistical significance. (Table 4) A selective summary of actual event study analyses involving securities issued by public companies is provided i n Table 4 . The focus of these summaries is on the reported improvement in the "information" as measured by the incremental increases in the adjusted R -squared and incremental reductions in the abnormal return standard errors associated with refined market model indices and controlling for known companyspecific events. The various event studies performed included observations covering the periods of interest (typically the proposed "class period," or period of adequately pled fraud, in securities litigation) and periods before or after the periods of interest. In order to provide further information, when possible and informative, the market models were also estimated over periods that excluded the most significant events of interest for some of the securities listed.
Applied Single-Company Event Study Results
The exact protocol in each case involved a search for company-specific news events over a variety of databases that fit within a list of the types of news that would be "potentially" material to investors as set forth in various published sources. 49 As a general list, the identified company-specific events included: (i) significant customer news or developments; (ii) significant product or technical news or developments; (iii) government or regulatory developments uniquely affecting the company (not having the same relative effects on the security prices of peers included in an industry index); (iv) news of significant litigation involving the company, including news regarding possible changes, or changes, in the expected outcome of significant litigation; (v) unexpected accounting or tax news (for example, restatements, issues with internal controls or audits); (vi) unexpected changes in the organization or operations (including restructurings, layoffs, strikes, or sales, or discontinuations or disposals of significant operations); (vii) news regarding earnings not previously disclosed (such as the reported earnings results for a given quarter disclosed in a press release or discussed in a conference call); (viii) investor presentations noted publicly that provided unexpected or altered financial information or guidance, disclosures of interim or preliminary financial results from operations, or changes in expected revenues or earnings guidance; (ix) news regarding mergers, acquisitions or disposals/sales of operations or assets; (x) inclusion or exclusion of the security in a widely considered market index; (xi) news of unexpected stock splits, changes in dividends or distributions; anticipated or actual changes in capitalization (issuing, repurchasing or otherwise retiring debt or equity securities, or significantly altering the terms of debt or equity financing); and (xii) changes in ratings, recommendations, or estimated financial prospects (including future revenue and earnings forecasts) issued by security analysts or credit analysts. Additionally, depending on the frequency or magnitude and indication of importance in various news and analysts' comments, significant executive changes and insider trading disclosures were often included as company-specific events. To the extent reported publicly, rumors of the listed material company-specific events were separately included as events in the analyses. The most comprehensive searches (listed as "thorough" in Table 4 ) were conducted by multiple researchers over multiple databases from Bloomberg, LP, securities filings (EDGAR), Factiva (or Dow Jones News Retrieval), Lexis-Nexis, and Investext, and were subject to an extensive internal review and verification process. Less comprehensive searches (listed as "moderate" or "preliminary" depending on the number of databases searched and the intensity of the search within each database) did not consider information in all of the available databases or were not performed by multiple researchers but were subject to internal review and verification. Occasionally, additional searches were made by considering news and analyst reports identified in First Call or reviewing Internet bulletin board postings over selected periods of time to identify the timing and transmission of some information not otherwise found in the databases. Only publicly available information was considered in each event study.
For each event study summarized in Table 4 , the total number of trade days (observations considered), the time period over which the observations were considered, and the number of identified material company-specific events is provided. The adjusted Rsquared and estimated residual standard errors from market models estimated using the CAR Method (controlling for no events) and the Intervention Method regressions are then reported and compared to illustrate the gain in the "information content" resulting from controlling for identified company-specific events and the resulting reduction in the residual standard errors. In each case, the Intervention Method was performed as part of a consulting assignment using a consistent pre-determined protocol for selecting events as discussed in the immediately prior paragraph. It is also noted in each case whether an independent researcher reviewed the results (typically an opposing consulting firm, or expert, or an independent "consulting" or "rebuttal" expert hired to verify and review the results if prepared for litigation) for errors in implementation.
Given the reasons for most of the event studies listed in Table 4 (securities litigation in most cases) and the fact that the event studies covered the periods of interest (with the events of interest typically increasing the estimated standard errors relative to the CAR Method), the results overstate, to some extent, the improvement in the adjusted R-squared and reduction in the standard errors to be gained by controlling for extraneous companyspecific events relative to the average case when no securities litigation has occurred. Nevertheless, the comparisons are instructive and illustrate the wide range of results and potential improvements that occur when extraneous company-specific events are an important part of the return generating process. The average incremental reduction in the standard error resulting from controlling for company-specific events was 30.8% across the equity securities of the 36 different companies considered over the entire event study period. By comparison, the market model indices reduced the standard error by an average of 19.0% for the same securities over the same time periods.
In order to address the potential overstatement of the gain in information from controlling for extraneous company-specific events, some of the market model regressions excluded the most extreme events of interest and time periods. A total of 17 common stock event studies were rerun excluding the periods of the events of interest. In these 17 regressions, the average reduction in the standard error resulting from the market model indices was 17.0% and the average incremental reduction in the standard error resulting from controlling for identified company-specific events was 17.7%. This is a substantial difference in the standard error and materially alters the measured significance of individual events. For example, a 17.7% reduction in the standard error of the estimate will result in an increase in the estimated t -statistic for a given event from 1.64 (just below the threshold for significance at the 10% level in a two-tailed test) to 1.99 (above the threshold for significance at the 5% level in a two-tailed test). Further, in a number of the single-company studies, there were significant differences in the underlying volatility of the securities in the periods of interest, as compared with the supposed "clean" period, such that the standard error estimated by the market model in the "clean" period was not a reliable estimate of the standard error on "non-event" days during the period of interest.
The range of adjusted R-squared results for the CAR Method market model regressions is quite wide. In some instances, the companies fell into financial distress, leading to substantial increases in the standard errors and reductions in the adjusted R-squared for the CAR market model regressions. In other cases, a company had excellent industry peers included in an industry index, resulting in a relatively high adjusted R-squared in the CAR Method market model regression, especially when the company's common share price was based on a commodity price (such as the price of gold for Barrick Gold and the price of oil and gas for Stone Energy). During periods of relatively lower volatility (including when excluding the most extreme periods of interest from the estimation period), controlling for company-specific events results in less improvement in the adjusted R-squared, and the relative reduction in the standard error of the estimate is not as large. Nevertheless, the increase in the adjusted R-squared and the reduction in the estimated standard errors were statistically significant and sufficient to potentially alter the statistical inferences for the events of interest and the overall conclusions from the analyses in all but a coup le of the securities studied in Table 4 . Also of note, despite lower volatility, the gains associated with controlling for identified company-specific events were almost as great for the fixed income securities listed as for the common equity securities for the same companies.
Conclusion
This paper demonstrates that using the comprehensive Intervention Method (even when some interventions are omitted, interventions are chosen selectively or some "false" interventions are mistakenly included in the analys is) to perform event study analyses results in a substantial gain in precision in the market model estimates, a substantial increase in the power of statistical tests, and a substantial reduction in the biases (toward not finding statistical significance f or the events of interest) in the statistical inferences relative to the CAR Method and relative to the Limited Intervention Method (when the CAR Method is not available or reliable).
However, this paper does not establish that the CAR Method is inherently wrong or so unreliable that it should be rejected entirely. In fact, the biases in the estimated coefficients of the market model and event effects of interest, in practice, are tolerably small in most cases using the CAR Method and can sometimes be additionally reduced by increasing the number of observations used to estimate the market model (by expanding the estimation period or considering the same types of event across multiple securities of the different companies in the event studies commonly published in the peer reviewed academic literature) or corrected by assuming a zero constant term in the market model before calculating the event effect estimates. Furthermore, when the event study analyses, utilizing the CAR or Limited Intervention Methods, conclude that an event or set of events are statistically significant (such that one can reject the null hypothesis that the event or events had no material effect or no reliably measurable effect), then one can be almost certain that the conclusion is correct given the known bias toward not finding statistical significance inherent with these methods. 50 Rather, this paper demonstrates that the statistical inferences and determination of statistical significance of the events of interest are substantially biased toward not finding statistical significance when the CAR and Limited Intervention Methods are employed, except in the extreme ly unlikely case that extraneous company-specific events are not a significant portion of the abnormal return variance over the observations used to estimate the market model and derive the standard errors. Since the statistical inferences are often of primary concern in applied practice, especially in securities litigation, 51 these known biases in the statistical inferences resulting from the CAR Method are not tolerable whenever they result in a failure to find statistical significance for an event or the events of interest, especially whenever the amounts at stake justify the additional effort of employing the Intervention Method, instead of the CAR Method. To the extent that the CAR Method and the Limited Intervention Methods are known to be biased toward not finding statistical significance, the researcher might also consider some method of adjusting for that bias by either relaxing the threshold t -statistics or other test statistics (such as an F-test for multiple events) required for statistical significance in order to account for the bias or refrain from reaching decisive conclusions regarding the effects, or lack of effects, of the events of interest. 52 In many circumstances, the failure to find statistical significance (rejecting the null hypothesis) for an event or set of events of interest in event study analyses based on the CAR or Limited Intervention Methods is not a reliable conclusion and should not lead the researcher to conclude that the event or events of interest were "immaterial," "insignificant," "caused no damages," or had insufficient effects to be reliably measured. When the statistical inferences are known to be substantially biased or when the power of the test is weak, the failure to find statistical significance may be more a result of a misspecified or inadequately specified model and should not be relied upon to reach dispositive conclusions based on the failure to find statistical significance.
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A number of misconceptions regarding single-company event study analyses are addressed in this paper, including the following:
1. There is a misconception that the CAR Method is equivalent to the Intervention Method in event study analyses in terms of bias and efficiency, and both methods produce approximately the same conclusions when "correctly" implemented. In fact, the two methods are clearly not the same in terms of the standard errors and t-statistics w hen applied in real-world settings where extraneous companyspecific events explain a substantial portion of the variance in daily security returns.
2. There is a misconception that the standard errors and statistical inferences resulting from the CAR Method are unbiased and consistent. In fact, when extraneous company-specific events result in significant abnormal returns during the estimation period, the estimated standard errors resulting from the CAR Method are always biased upward and the t-statistics are always biased downward toward not finding statistical significance for the events of interest.
3. There is a misconception that controlling for all extraneous company-specific events (especially those that are not statistically significant) causes the standard errors to be understated and the t-statistics to be overstated relative to the "true" standard errors and t-statistics for the events of interest. In fact, controlling for extraneous company-specific events eliminates a known bias and will not, when done on an a priori and theoretical basis, lead to understated standard errors or overstated t-statistics.
4. There is a misconception that o ne should only control for those extraneous company-specific events that prove, in retrospect, to be statistically significant or extremely statistically significant (outliers) and controlling for all or "too many" extraneous company-specific events will bias the estimates, caus ing the standard errors to be understated and the t-statistics to be overstated relative to the "true" standard errors and t-statistics for the events of interest. In fact, the reverse is true. Mathematically, controlling for immaterial events, mistakes in the form of identifying and controlling for "too many" events, and controlling for material events that did not have estimated effects that were determined to be statistically significant will not cause the estimated t-statistics to be overstated or the 53 See, for example, Lehmann & Romano (2005) , "The choice of a level of significance a is usually somewhat arbitrary, since in most situations there is no precise limit to the probability of an error of the first kind that can be tolerated. Standard values, such as .01 or .05, were originally chosen to effect a reduction in the tables needed for carrying out various test. By habit, and because of the convenience of standardization in providing a common frame of reference, these values gradually became entrenched as the conventional levels to use. This is unfortunate, since the choice of significance level should also take into consideration the power that the test will achieve against the alternatives of interest" (pp. 57-58).
estimated standard errors to be understated for the events of interest. While "datamining," or "cherry-picking," by controlling for nearly all and only the "significant" company-specific events after initial estimation can cause a modest overstatement of the t-statistics and understatement of the standard errors for the events of interest, even data-mining will reduce the potential biases in the estimation of the effects of the events of interest, and will produce more correct and substantially less biased statistical inferences relative to the CAR and Limited Intervention Methods in practice.
A number of important and relevant points are illustrated in the simulations presented in this paper. These points are as follows:
1. In event study analyses, the failure to control for all material company-specific events will always cause the estimates of the t-statistics of the events of interest to be substantially and materially understated relative to the "actual" t -statistics whenever extraneous company-specific events explain a statistically significant portion of the variance in security returns in the estimation period.
2. When the effects of extraneous company-specific events are not skewed or skewed only slightly on average relative to all of the trade dates considered, the failure to control for material company-specific events will not significantly bias the estimates of the market model coefficients and effects of the events of interest using either the CAR or the Limited Intervention Methods, but will still result in greater estimation errors and lower t-statistics for the event estimates than are achievable by attempting to control for material company-specific events entirely or at least for the most part.
3. The inclusion of immaterial company-specific events as interventions in the analysis will not bias the estimation of the market model coefficients or event effects, and will not cause the estimated absolute t-statistics for the event effects of interest to be overstated. Furthermore, in practice, the loss of degrees of freedom is modest and tolerable when "false" or "immaterial" events are erroneously included in the analyses.
4. Perfect implementation of the Intervention Method correctly estimates the market model coefficients and event effects, and provides the correct statistical inferences against which all alternative event study methods should be tested. Imperfect implementation, with a few plausible exceptions, of the comprehensive Intervention Method results in a loss of efficiency and potential increase in bias in the estimated coefficients and will lead to an underestimation of the t-statistics for the events of interest. In practice from a bias and efficiency perspective, it is virtually always better to attempt to control for some material extraneous company-specific events than to control for no extraneous company-specific events in estimating the market model, eve nt effects, and standard errors as long as the extraneous events, as a group, are statistically significant.
5. Absent some plausible alternative economic explanation, a non-zero constant term in the estimation of the market model is presumably the result of skewness in the abnormal returns in the market model estimation period as a result of known or unknown company-specific information events not explicitly controlled for by intervention variables. The presence of significant skewness in the abnormal returns generally results in a statistically insignificant (but economically meaningful) bias in the estimation of the event effects in individual event study analyses, an upward bias in the estimated standard errors for the eve nts of interest, and will bias downward the estimated absolute t-statistics of the events of interest.
To correct for the slight biases in estimating the event effects, one should generally ignore the constant term in the market model estimates when estimating the abnormal returns on the event dates of interest. The more complete and comprehensive the intervention analysis, the more these biases in the estimated event effects and t-statistics will diminish, resulting in more efficient and reliable estimates and more correct statistical inferences. Notes:
(1) The T-statistics for events in the CAR Method were not adjusted for market model estimation error but were adjusted in all other analyses.
(2) The estimates of event effects and the constant term were unbiased due to an absence of skewness on average in the abnormal return residuals and extraneous event effects being simulated. Notes:
(2) The estimates of event effects and the constant term were generally unbiased due to only slight skewness on average in the extraneous event effects being simulated in advance.
(3) Bias estimates in bold are significantly different from zero at the 1.0% significance level (absolute z-stat fo 2.33 or greater).
